Studies have consistently found that social structure influences who transacts with whom, and that actors appear to benefit when exchange occurs embedded within these relations rather than in an unstructured market. Explanations for these results frequently point to their effectiveness in solving problems inherent in the trade of certain products and services, focusing on the ability of these social networks to provide access to private information regarding the quality of the goods or to allow participants to enforce the terms of the exchange agreement. In investigating these dynamics in the interaction between movie producers and distributors, this paper, however, suggests that a type of self-confirming prophecy can also produce such effects: Buyers frequently offer better terms of trade in transactions embedded within existing social relations, thereby contributing to the sellers' success. In the motion picture industry, not only do distributors show a preference for carrying films involving key personnel with whom they have prior relations, but also they tend to favor these films when making decisions regarding their release -in determining opening dates and the amount of resources devoted to marketing. Empirical estimates of the performance of movies in the U.S. box office reveal that -when models fail to account for these key decisions -distributors appear to benefit from carrying movies affiliated with known parties, confirming their beliefs that they have private information regarding the quality of the talent involved. After controlling for marketing effort and seasonality, however, these effects disappear, suggesting that, rather than arbitraging price-quality inconsistencies, distributors produce these effects through their own efforts.
INTRODUCTION
One of the best-known findings in economic sociology is that pre-existing social structures play a prominent role in determining who transacts with whom.
1 Evidence for this patterning of exchange appears both in the local and global topologies of trading networks. At the most narrow, dyadic, level, for example, researchers find that individuals and organizations tend to interact repeatedly with the same trading partners even when many alternatives (i.e. substitutes) exist (Gouldner, 1960; Geertz, 1978; Baker, 1990) . Meanwhile extensions investigating the structure of the indirect relations surrounding a potential exchange dyad demonstrate that the cohesiveness of these local structures appears to increase the probability of exchange (Simmel, 1908; Portes and Sensenbrenner, 1993; DiMaggio and Louch, 1998) . Though developed in a largely distinct line of literature, this logic also underlies the more macro-level (global topology) arguments surrounding the importance of status as a characteristic structuring the market: Central positions in the exchange network attract more potential trading partners (Veblen, 1899; Podolny, 1993; see Gould, 2002 , for an analytical treatment), once again suggesting that the social structure influences patterns of trade.
A closely related line of empirical research meanwhile demonstrates that these embedded exchanges provide economic benefits to those that engage in them. Uzzi (1996) , for instance, finds lower failure rates among garment manufacturers that interact more intensively with a limited set of exchange partners. Stuart (2000) demonstrates that semiconductor firms in alliances with highly innovative partners benefit both in terms of their own rate of innovation and in sales growth. And in the Sydney hotel market, Ingram and Roberts (2000) show that hotels with managers who have more extensive and cohesive networks to rivals enjoy higher utilization rates, a key measure of success in that industry.
2 Investigating the broader pattern of relations, Podolny (1993) finds that high status investment banks -those occupying axial positions in debt syndication networkscan extract larger margins (fees) on the most attractive deals in the corporate debt market (see also Stuart, Hoang and Hybels, 1999 , for an examination of initial public offerings). Though the granularity of the measurement of social structure differs across these settings, all point to a link between position in this structure and rewards.
In seeking to explain these patterns, social scientists have typically highlighted two mechanisms through which social networks might engender more efficient exchange. The first centers on the access to private information that these networks afford prior to a 1 Though this assertion likely holds true for the broader definition of social structure as well, our usage of the term denotes only its more narrow sense of referring to the pattern of relations linking actors in a social system (Laumann, 1966) . 2 Evidence for the benefits of embedded exchange has accumulated with particular speed in the literature on organizations. Several studies, for example, find positive relationships between position in corporate directorate interlocks and firm performance (e.g., Mizruchi, 1992; Geletkanycz and Hambrick, 1997) , connect repeated transactions between buyers and suppliers to more cooperative behavior and improved performance of buyers (e.g., Heide and Miner, 1992; Zaheer, McEvily and Perrone, 1998) , and link the stability of a firm's network of strategic alliance partners to its financial performance, innovativeness and longevity (e.g., Mitchell and Singh, 1996; Powell, Koput and Smith-Doerr, 1996) , to name but a few.
transaction. In cases where potential exchange partners differ substantially in the quality of their offerings and actors find it difficult to evaluate this heterogeneity a priori, information regarding the likely quality of these alters or their wares through prior experience with them, or through the prior experience of others, may help inform the selection of exchange partners (Granovetter, 1985; Podolny, 1993) . A second explanation revolves around the ability of social networks to aid in the enforcement of contracts, either through better observation of whether the other party completed their side of the bargain, or induced via the application of more effective threats of punishment in response to non-compliance (Bott, 1957; Coleman, 1990) .
Though these factors likely explain the frequency of embedded exchange in many important settings, these circumstances need not exist to foment the development of stable, network-based patterns of trade. Indeed, we contend that a type of self-confirming prophecy might also account for this pattern of findings: Not only do actors prefer to exchange with known parties (i.e. those with whom they share prior relations or indirect ties), but also -believing these parties to be higher quality or more trustworthy -they offer them better terms of trade and invest more in the transaction when they do exchange. Such favorable treatment itself can contribute to the success of their partners. Consider an example: An investor might offer better terms to a businessperson with whom he shares a connection because he feels less uncertain regarding the likely success of the venture. The lower cost of capital implied, however, may well allow the businessperson to succeed, thereby confirming the investor's original expectations -even though the venture may have failed if it had obtained market interest rates. By virtue of their actions, market participants thus enact the very results that they expect. 3 Despite the fact that some prior work has alluded to such a self-confirming dynamic, it has remained in the background in both theoretical and empirical research on the dynamics of exchange. Many discussing the importance of trust in facilitating transactions, for example, note that trust may have little grounding in actual differences in the reliability of potential exchange partners (e.g., Geertz, 1978; Coleman, 1990) ; nonetheless, efforts to portray trust as a rational basis for action largely dominate the literature. Podolny (1993) similarly defines status only in terms of perceived quality and notes that the structure of exchange relations may impede the alignment of these perceptions with the true underlying values, but nonetheless maintains that status rankings loosely correspond to true quality distinctions among producers. Hence, though admitting its possibility, the literature has largely downplayed it and -to our knowledge -failed to investigate it empirically. 4 3 Though limited research has considered such self-confirming dynamics, recent analytic work in economics (Fudenberg and Levine, 1993; Kalai and Lehrer, 1993 ; but see also Hayek, 1937) and strategy (Ryall, 2003) has demonstrated the potential for stable 'subjective' equilibrium when observed payoffs correspond to actors' expectations. 4 This paucity of research in economic contexts may reflect the difficulty of obtaining systematic information on the intervening variable: the amount of effort and resources allocated to exchange. A strong awareness of the potential for self-confirming dynamics and a research tradition does exist in the sociology of education where experimental manipulation has been used to identify these effects. Rosenthal and Jacobson (1968) , for example, demonstrate in their classic experiment that randomly assigning students to a 'gifted' condition improved their performance in the classroom. More recently, Lovaglia and his colleagues In addition to elaborating a theory of how these self-confirming dynamics might persist, this paper also provides evidence that this explanation appears to explain embedded exchange in at least one setting: the motion picture industry. In particular, we examine the relationship between production companies -teams of producers, writers, directors and actors who cooperate to make a film -and distribution companies. Our results show that distribution companies show a strong preference for working repeatedly with the same sets of individuals, and that -without controls for the effort the distributor invests in marketing these films -a strategy of repeated interaction appears to yield higher U.S. box office revenue. If one controls for the actions of the distributor, however, these differences disappear, suggesting that distribution companies produce this result through their own actions. Distributors, moreover, apparently would benefit from allocating their resources more evenly across exchange partners.
The results potentially have a wide range of important applications. At a theoretical level, it resurrects one of the most consistent and unique ideas in sociology -the distinction between the actor and the position. Particularly among work that attributes the benefits of embedded exchange to search, researchers rely heavily on an exogenously determined distribution of underlying quality as an explanation for the patterns of exchange. These results, on the other hand, suggest that researchers should exercise particular caution when attributing the benefits of social position to qualities of the actors occupying them, as many important aspects of exchange behavior may remain hidden from participants and researchers alike. At a more applied level, these ideas call attention to the importance of unobserved (and endogenous) behaviors across many types of exchange. For example, in internal labor markets, sponsorship networks may engender replication of the demographic characteristics among the upper echelon of employees, creating a 'glass ceiling' for those employees excluded from these mentoring relations.
THE ANTECEDENTS OF EMBEDDED EXCHANGE
The large and growing body of studies demonstrating the importance of social structure in channeling the movement of resources and shaping the patterns of exchange has focused primarily on two classes of theory to explain their results. 5 The first highlights the value of access to private information regarding the true quality of a good prior to exchange. A second points to the importance of social networks in mitigating opportunism when the nature of the transaction opens actors to this agency problem.
(1998) produced similar effects on standardized test scores by randomly identifying students as 'high status' prior to the administration of the exam. 5 Though less common in the literature, some explanations -for example, those based on power (e.g., Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Markovsky, Willer and Patton, 1988 ) -draw on alternative explanations for embedded exchange. Power-based accounts, in particular, offer little purchase in this setting: Our research seeks to explain why distributors favor known parties when selecting among films. If certain production companies had substantial power over distributors that might explain their ability to extract favorable terms, but if anything the power asymmetry in this industry runs in the opposite direction (i.e., distributors have more power than film production companies).
PRE-EXCHANGE: ACCESS TO INFORMATION
Much of the work seeking to explain the prevalence of embedded exchange has identified access to private information as a key issue in understanding the value of transacting with a circumscribed set of potential exchange partners. The idea that information diffuses through social networks has a long tradition in sociology, particularly investigating the diffusion of innovations (Ryan and Gross, 1943; Coleman, Katz and Mendel, 1966) . Studies emphasizing the importance of access to private information prior to exchange extend this insight to the process of selecting from a menu of potential products or producers: Many types of goods and services vary along a quality dimension. When buyers have difficulty accurately observing this quality a priori, atomistic markets fail. Buyers worried about receiving low quality goods only offer bids for the value of these inferior products; sellers of high quality goods, unable to receive fair compensation for them, meanwhile may remove their wares from the market -a situation labeled by Akerlöf (1970) as the 'lemons' problem. Access to private information -for example, from personal experience or from other parties that have previously transacted with a vendor -can ameliorate this problem by reducing buyer uncertainty regarding the quality of the goods being offered. Geertz (1978) points to this explanation as a key reason why individuals repeatedly purchase goods from the same vendors in peasant bazaars. And DiMaggio and Louch (1998) find that when uncertainty afflicts the quality of a good, consumers prefer to purchase from suppliers with whom they share mutual contacts since they assume they would have heard about quality problems, if any existed, through their networks. Even the growing literature on the importance of structural holes points to this issue, highlighting the importance of the extensiveness of the reach of an actor's networks in providing information regarding the availability of exchange opportunities (Burt, 1992) .
To a large extent, this logic also underlies the substantial literature highlighting the benefits of status in exchange. Under conditions of uncertainty, actors prefer to exchange with higher status partners. This pattern occurs, according to Podolny (1993) , because status itself acts as a signal in the absence of more direct evidence of the underlying quality of goods offered by a producer (though Gould, 2002 , demonstrates analytically and provides some evidence that these status differences likely exaggerate actual heterogeneity in the quality distribution). Hence, explanations of the rents associated with status frequently attribute them to signals of an actor or good's quality. Stuart, Hoang and Hybels (1999) , for instance, point prominently to such an account in discussing their finding that biotech firms affiliated with higher status partners enjoy both better odds of going public (i.e. selling stock on a public exchange) and greater investor demand when they do sell equity. Kim and Laumann (2003) similarly attribute the greater wages earned by lawyers affiliated with higher status attorneys, particularly early in their careers, to the signaling that these relations provide regarding the (difficult to observe) skill of the lawyers.
Though less commonly identified as a key factor, access to information may also benefit actors subsequent to the selection of a trading partner. Embedded relations can also facilitate the transfer of highly tacit knowledge, which may allow one or both parties in an exchange to improve their production processes or to innovate more effectively. Studying product development teams in a high tech company, for instance, Hansen (1999) finds that strong ties appear particularly valuable in transferring the dense technological knowledge important to these projects. The importance of dense relations between parties also appears in the literature on organizational learning. Darr, Argote and Epple (1995) , for example, show that spillovers in learning across pizza franchisees occur only among those belonging to the same owner (see also, Thorton and Thompson, 2001 , for evidence from ship building). Strong relations between broadcaster and recipient of knowledge may prove particularly important when sharing complex, tacit knowledge that requires bi-directional communication for effective transfer. Hence, the value of access to information in embedded exchange may extend beyond the selection process.
In the film industry, access to at least two types of information might prove advantageous to distributors. On the one hand, distributors must select among the thousands of projects pitched to them to decide which they will choose to market and distribute to theaters. Though industry participants regard the selection of films more of an art than a science, the belief that at least some can discriminate among likely hits and misses pervades the industry (Vogel, 2001) . Better access to information may allow distributors to either pursue likely winners with the hopes of locking up a contract before rivals become aware of the opportunity, or see hidden value in a project comprising participants whose true talent the market has not generally realized (e.g., the undiscovered talent or the rising star). Once an agreement has been made, strong ties may facilitate the exchange of dense information crucial to targeting the right audience and marketing the picture successfully. Distributors may therefore benefit from transacting repeatedly with the same parties, or with those with whom they have strong indirect connections.
POST-EXCHANGE: ENFORCEMENT OF AGREEMENTS
Embedded relations can also prove useful following an exchange in ensuring its completion according to the terms of the (possible implicit) contract. When exchange does not occur simultaneously, uncertainty frequently surrounds whether the individual or organization moving last in the sequence of exchanges agreed upon will fulfill their obligations (Løvås and Sorenson, 2003) . 6 In these situations, social networks facilitate exchange in several ways. Both prior experience between the parties and secondary connections through other actors allow each participant to develop stronger -though possibly inaccurate -expectations of the behavior of the other (Granovetter, 1985; Sorenson and Stuart, 2001) . A more intense relation, involving both more frequent and more intimate contact, and shared indirect ties also increases the capacity of each actor to 6 The importance of this uncertainty appears quite starkly in the comparison of finite and infinite period repeated games. In Prisoners' Dilemma games, for example, rational actors cooperate under a wide variety of conditions in infinite period games. In situations where players know the final period, on the other hand, all players usually defect. The behavioral difference reflects this uncertainty on the outcome of the final exchange (and a weak assumption of opportunistic behavior): Players fail to cooperate because they believe that the other party will defect on them in the final round (backward induction then propagates these effects such that rational players never cooperate once they anticipate such defection). Interestingly, work on selfconfirming equilibrium in economics began as an investigation of how the equilibrium could deviate from Nash equilibrium in finite period games (e.g., Fudenberg and Levine, 1993) . monitor the other (Merry, 1984) . Moreover, the ability to coordinate sanctioning activity afforded by cohesive network structures raises the expected severity of punishment to actors that might consider reneging on their agreements (Bott, 1957; Coleman, 1990) . Though difficult to disentangle from the effects of pre-exchange selection in many contexts, situations in which the primarily risk involves defection -as opposed to unobserved heterogeneity in quality -offer the clearest examples of these mechanisms in practice. Portes and Sensenbrenner's (1993) description of the lending practices among members of ethnic enclaves thus comes to mind: Business owners in these communities lend each other substantial amounts, frequently even without writing contracts, yet defection (default) on these loans occurs infrequently. Baker (1984) also points to social cohesion as an important factor in keeping options traders in the market, maintaining liquidity and reducing volatility.
Though less prominent in the literature on status, reputation may also play a role in ensuring the faithful completion of a contract. To the extent that exchange partners can extract better prices based on their status, these very reputations may hold them hostage to honoring the terms of an agreement lest they lose this advantage. This argument appears most frequently in the game theoretic economics literature examining why rational actors would invest in the establishment of brand names and how this branding activity can solve market failures due to information asymmetry (e.g., Akerlöf, 1970; Kreps and Wilson, 1982 ; see Charness and Garoupa, 2000 , for experimental evidence). This literature, however, differs substantially in its flavor from sociological accounts because it assumes that all actors in a market can observe the faithful completion of an agreement, while the latter points precisely to the difficulty of obtaining such information in many cases when identifying the potential value of social networks.
Though in many contexts an important factor, this aspect of embedded exchange likely plays a minor role, at most, in the relationships between film production companies and distributors. Distribution contracts typically specify that the owners of the film receive their payments after the distributor has recouped its own expenses. Moreover, these agreements pay a percentage of the gross receipts after marketing expenditures to the film production company. This tight alignment of incentives virtually eliminates the incentives for opportunistic behavior (Chrisholm, 1997) . Though one might worry about the risk of non-completion, modern contracts routinely require completion risk insurance, mitigating the risk of this hazard. Our consideration of the potential advance of embedded exchange in the movie industry hence focuses on the benefits of information access.
SELF-CONFIRMING DYNAMICS: EFFORT AND OUTCOMES
Admittedly both of these factors likely explain the propensity for actors to exchange with known parties in a variety of circumstances; nonetheless, embedded exchange might easily persist even if it does not provide an effective solution to market failure. Rather, individuals and organizations might exchange with known parties believing that these parties offer better investments or higher quality goods and services. Further acting on those beliefs, actors may offer better terms (e.g., prices) or favor these parties when making decisions regarding the value of an exchange. These favorable terms themselves, however, may then enact the beneficial outcomes expected by their exchange partners.
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE Figure 1 illustrates the essential logic of the argument. While the left panel depicts the actual causal relations between actions and outcomes, the right shows the simplified version believed and observed by market participants. Without considering the intermediary relationship between social structure and the terms of exchange, actors' observations will confirm their beliefs in the right panel.
Two relationships prove central to producing this effect. First, embedded exchange leads actors to offer better terms to the partners with which they transact. Several factors might explain such a relationship. Presuming that they have private information regarding the quality of the goods or services that they have selected may lead buyers to offer better terms than the market price, believing that their direct or indirect relations to the seller allow them to arbitrage the lemons problem. Uzzi (1999) , for example, finds that bankers offer lower interest rates to small businesses when they have personal connections to the managers of those firms, presumably thinking that their personal relationship gives them access to better information on the quality of the credit risk. Less systematic evidence similarly suggests that venture capitalists more likely invest, and invest more, in founding teams with whom they share prior experience or secondary relations (Fried and Hisrich, 1994 ; see also Sorenson and Stuart, 2001; Burton, Sørensen and Beckman, 2002) . Alternatively, actors may perceive less risk of opportunism when trading with known partners; hence, they may accept lower expected returns in exchange for this perceived mitigation of risk. Kollock's (1994) experiments illustrate this effect vividly as his participants repeatedly forgo better prices to exchange with known partners under conditions of uncertainty. Meanwhile in the field, Guseva and Rona-Tas (2001) find that Russian credit card issuers rely on personal networks to guide their lending practices in the absence of credit rating institutions. Exchange partners may also simply offer better terms because the exchange no longer occurs entirely at a transactional level (Granovetter, 1985) . In other words, their interest in the relationship (friendship) itself may lead them to forgo the intense negotiation necessary to extract the maximum value out of the exchange.
Second, these favorable terms must contribute to the expected outcome. Though less commonly investigated, this assumption seems relatively intuitive. Consider the lower interest rates offered by Uzzi's (1999) bankers. These preferred terms reduce the cost of capital and cash flow requirements for the firms receiving them, benefits that may well reduce the risk of firm failure and with it loan default. The same holds true for equity investments: Venture capitalists by offering more funds to founders improve the likely success of these fledgling firms as well; research shows a positive relationship between the level of venture capital investment and firm growth (Davila, Foster and Gupta, 2001) and the likelihood of a successful IPO (Stuart and Sorenson, 2003) . Other types of nonfinancial investments may also benefit transaction partners.
In the success of films, the key terms of trade likely concerns the amount of resources allocated to marketing. Distributors believing that they have special knowledge regarding the likely success of a project may invest more in marketing films when they enjoy a strong tie with the principals involved in the project. Repeated interaction may also promote an exaggerated belief in the underlying quality of the participants involved. In either case, distributors have control over two decisions important to the financial success of a film: its release date, and the amount spent on advertising it. Therefore, distributors, believing these films to have better odds of becoming a box office hit, may allocate the films with which they have the strongest ties to the most desirable opening dates (e.g., the 4 th of July) and expend more resources promoting them. This market support, in turn, can contribute to the success of these films, thereby (in appearance) confirming the distributor's expectations.
At least two factors help maintain the stability of this subjective equilibrium. On the one hand, actors may see little reason to test the counterfactual. To the extent that the feedback from their perception of the environment matches their expectations, market participants may avoid behavior that would produce evidence that could invalidate their view (Ryall, 2003) . Such behavior might occur at two levels. Actors may refrain almost entirely from transacting with unknown parties, thereby making it impossible for them to assess the potential benefits of embedded exchange. Even when they do interact, however, with first-time (or less well known) partners they may uniformly favor their closest exchange partners when deciding on the terms of trade, again eliminating the possibility of falsifying their expectations.
Though even rational actors can fall prey to these dynamics, common psychological biases likely crystallize the stability of these systems. Ambiguity aversion, for example, would lead actors to avoid unknown risks. Though the odds of success of any film seems uncertain, Fox and Tversky (1995) argue that comparative ignorance drives ambiguity aversion. In other words, individuals avoid the option about which they know the least. As a bias, ambiguity aversion appears both quite common and surprising difficult to inoculate against. Even professional decision makers appear susceptible. Both options traders and elite decision scientists exhibit ambiguity aversion, despite being perfectly risk-neutral when making choices (e.g., Fox and Tversky, 1996) . This bias should reinforce actors' failure to test the counterfactual.
Even when access to the counterfactual exists, psychological biases may impede actors' ability to realize that the information conflicts with their expectations. One of the better documented behaviors in the psychology of decision-making finds that humans seek out and allocate undo attention to information that confirms their existing beliefs or expectations, a tendency recognized as early as Bacon (1620) . Experimental research has demonstrated that subjects actively avoid information that might disconfirm their beliefs (Wason, 1968) . Even when confronted with evidence that should lead them to update their beliefs, subjects frequently interpret somewhat ambiguous information as supportive of their expectations (e.g., Jones and Sugden, 2001) . Given these tendencies, it seems likely that actors could maintain their beliefs in the value of transacting with known partners even in the face of occasional evidence to the contrary -especially in a market with as high variance outcomes as film exhibition.
EMPIRICAL CONTEXT: MOTION PICTURE DISTRIBUTION
To examine the potential for these dynamics empirically, we have collected and analyzed data on the U.S. motion picture industry. In particular, our study investigates relationships between production companies, their principals and distributors.
In the film industry, distributors provide an important link between production companies, which assemble and coordinate the resources necessary to create a motion picture, and theaters, which exhibit these films to the movie-going public. Though at one time firms, known as the 'major studios' (20 th Century Fox, Metro Goldwyn Mayer, Paramount, RKO and Warner Brothers), integrated across these stages of the value chain, antitrust action led to a 1948 consent decree where the majors agreed to divest their theater holdings (Conant, 1960) . During the same time period, competition forced them to end exclusive contracting with talent, greatly reducing the extent of in-house production (Vogel, 2001) . The industry now comprises three sets of firms -production companies, distributors, and theaters -each focusing on a different stage of the process of bringing a new movie to market.
Though technically production companies make films, the principals involved frequently form these companies to make a single film, simply as an accounting convenience. Given the ephemeral nature of these companies and the frequent recombination of individuals across projects in the industry, we measure the attributes of the production firms by summing the qualities of the principals involved. These principals include producers, who usually assemble the team and arrange financing, writers, responsible for the script or screenplay, directors and actors.
Two relatively unusual features of this industry make it a prime candidate for determining whether these self-confirming dynamics exist. First and most significantly, we can observe with relative accuracy the most important activity that distributors undertake to the potential benefit of the film's production company, in this case their marketing decisions. Distributors have control over two important factors affecting the success of the movies they carry -the amount of resources devoted to marketing them, and their release dates -both of which can be observed with relative accuracy. Second, the fluid mixing of principals into different sets of teams allows us to estimate individuallevel measures of quality, to some degree, thereby directly testing whether these differences account for selection effects in embedded transactions.
Data Sources
To test these dynamics within the context of the motion picture industry, we have assembled a database of all films ever generating a minimal level of ticket revenue in theatrical exhibition in the United States between 1982 and 2002. The data for each of these films comes primarily from two sources: the Internet Movie Database (imdb.com) and the weekly box office listings reported in Variety. For inclusion in the dataset, a film had to appear on the Variety listings of top-grossing films for at least one week during the observation period. Though one might worry that such a requirement would exclude a large number of films, the Variety listings include even films with extremely limited distribution; indeed, as few as 100 ticket sales could qualify a movie for inclusion on the Variety lists and nearly 10% of the motion pictures included in the dataset never appeared on more than one screen in the United States.
CHOOSING EXCHANGE PARTNERS
The first step in our analysis involves confirming that social networks do in fact influence the matching of films to distributors. This amounts to an analysis of tie formation (e.g., Podolny, 1994; Sorenson and Stuart, 2001) . Following prior studies, we generated a dyadic dataset in which each case represents a possible match between a film and a distributor. To construct such a dataset required us to make a decision regarding the risk set of potential distributors. We took a conservative approach and assumed that any distributor active in a particular year potentially could have carried a film being released in that year. Depending on the year, then, each film had between 25 and 100 potential suitors (the number of distributors has been rising steadily over the study period). As in prior research on the choice of exchange partners, a dichotomous variable, taking a value of one when a tie exists, represents the establishment of an exchange relation (i.e., a distributor choosing to market a particular picture).
To estimate the determinants of tie likelihood, we use a maximum likelihood conditional logistic regression (Chamberlain, 1980) . The conditional logistic calculates the likelihood relative to other cases in the group. Since we group observations by film, it essentially estimates the likelihood of a film being distributed by one company versus another. One could also think of our approach as analogous to a McFadden choice model, since film production companies nearly always maintain exclusive contracts with distributors within a geographic territory (the entire United States falls within a single territory for the purposes of these distribution rights).
Although the estimation technique controls for any film-level attributes, since film-level characteristics do not vary across the set of potential distributors, the models contain two controls for the traits of the distribution companies (Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for all of the models). The first, distributor capacity, simply counts the number of films that a distributor carried in the same year as the film's release. The likelihood of being distributed through a particular distributor obviously increases with that distributor's prevalence in the market. Second, we construct a measure of distributor specializationthe percentage of films that the distributor carried during the previous three years in the same genre as the film currently being considered. Distributors may show particular interest in carrying particular types of films. Descriptive statistics for these and other variables used in the models appear in Table 1. INSERT TABLES 1 & 2 ABOUT HERE Table 2 reports the estimates of the conditional logistic regressions. The first model simply provides a baseline. As one would expect, distributors with greater capacity more likely agree to market films, distributors with strong specialization in a particular genre show a preference for maintaining their niches. Model 2 introduces measures of the strength of the social connection between the film and its potential distributor. The first variable, prior tie, takes a value of one the at least one of the film's principals has worked with the distributor before, or zero otherwise. A second variable, counts the number of ties in excess of one that the group of principals has had to the distributor. Not only does having any prior connection dramatically increase the odds of a film being carried by a particular distributor, but also each addition prior connection appears to augment this probability. Though the difference between the magnitude of the coefficients between the first and subsequent ties seems to suggest decreasing returns to increasingly intensive connections, the relationship actually appears nearly linear. Figure 2 displays the results of a piece-wise estimation of the number of prior ties to tie likelihood. The first prior connection has a noticeably larger effect, but all subsequent ties contribute roughly the same amount to the likelihood of a future distribution relationship. Model 3 splits the prior ties among the principals, in essence testing whether prior relationships among principals in certain roles play a stronger role in securing distribution contracts. Perhaps not surprising given their role as coordinators of the team and of business relationships, prior relations between the producer and a potential distributor appear much more important than those of other participants in arranging distribution.
INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE EMBEDDED EXCHANGE AND PERFORMANCE
Following prior research, the next step involves determining whether embedded exchange appears to benefit the parties that engage in it. In the film industry, one can usefully investigate the apparent success of each transaction (agreement to market a film) separately. The ability to decompose the results to the level of the individual film affords us two advantages not available in many situations. Isolating effects to the level of the film -the level at which the networks themselves come into play -avoids potential aggregation bias inherent in a distributor-level measure of success. Moreover, the fact that the participants themselves also have access to this information should make it less likely for self-confirming dynamics to arise, hence providing a more conservative test of the thesis.
Dependent variable
The most direct measure of performance in the movie industry comes in the form of box office receipts. 7 For much of the history of the film industry, these revenues represented 7 In assessing the performance of new motion pictures some argue that researchers should focus on revenues net of costs ('profit'). The analyses presented in the paper do not account for costs for two reasons -one methodological, the other practical. Including budget in the performance equation seems problematic in two respects: First, depending on the stage at which distributors agree to carry motion pictures, the budget may well depend on this agreement itself, and hence vary endogenously with our primary variables of interest. Indeed, a multivariate analysis of the determinants of the reported budgets indicates that a one the only real source of income from the production of a motion picture. From 1900 to 1990, for example, theatrical exhibition accounted for 96% of the industry's revenue (Vogel, 2001 ). Though new technologies -television, VCR, cable, DVD -have opened additional channels from which to extract revenue, box office remains the most important benchmark when considering a film, as these ancillary revenues tend to correlate highly to the movie's performance during its theatrical exhibition period: Ravid and Basuroy (2003) found correlations of .86 between domestic (U.S.) and international box office revenue and .70 between domestic box office and video rentals. 8 Moreover, those studies investigating the correlates of these revenue sources find identical patterns of relations across the various sources (Ravid, 1999) .
Two common practices in the industry make these box office figures easily comparable across motion pictures. First, agreements between distribution companies and theater owners essentially split proceeds as a function of a percentage of total revenue, with an increasing portion going to the theater owners as the film matures; the arrangement roughly amounts to theater owners pro-rating their average cost of exhibition across the films they carry (Verter and McGahan, 1998; Vogel, 2001) . Exhibitors earn profits primarily through concession sales -popcorn, candy and soda. Second, the contracts between distributors and the owners of the film also near universally specify the fees due to the distributor as a straight percentage of the revenue earned (Litwak, 1998; Vogel, 2001 ). All participants hence benefit from maximizing total sales.
Independent variables
The models also include several controls for other characteristics of the team of principals involved in the film. At the most basic level, the number of principals, simply counts the number of different individuals involved in principal roles in the project. If each principal draws a particular audience (i.e., some people attend the movie because they like the director, while others go to see their favorite actress), projects with a larger number of principals may attract larger audiences, and hence greater theatrical revenue. In addition, the number of principals involved likely controls to some degree for the scale of the production itself. Recognizing, however, the likely heterogeneity in these participants, principals' experience, sums the experience of the principals, in terms of the number of films in which they have been involved, over the three years preceding the standard deviation increase in the strength of the connection between the film and the distribution company increases the expected budget by 7% (p < .10). Second, some production companies record costs such that the budget includes expenses tied to the success of the film (e.g., bonuses in actors' contracts); though this practice induces a correlation between budget and revenues, it problematically mixes types of costs. From a practical point of view, only a small portion of the movies in the sample report budget data, requiring us to drop 76% of the cases to include this information. In any case, models accounting for film budget produce qualitatively equivalent results to those reported (perhaps not surprising as prior studies have found little connection between budget and proceeds; e.g., Ravid, 1999) . 8 Though the popularity of a film in the theaters correlates strongly to its ability to garner revenue from home video rentals and television rights, contracts also tighten this relationship as video retailers and television stations sometimes pre-negotiate (before the film's release in theaters) a price for rights to a film as a function of its performance in the U.S. box office. release date of a film.
9 Experience likely captures several factors. On the one hand, principals may actually learn to perform their roles better or accumulate human capital over time. On the other hand, a selection process may simply weed out the least able over time. Also, since experience reflects the number of recent films in which an individual participated, it could also capture the degree to which someone is 'hot' -both in favor with audiences at the moment and likely subject to particularly intense media attention (the controls introduced below, however, should limit the importance of this factor).
In addition to these simple measures, the estimation includes two controls that provide different types of information on the underlying quality of the participants involved. Observed past performance averages the performance of other motion picture projects that the principals participated in over the three years preceding the release of the current film. Since all industry participants (and even casual observers) can easily access this information, it seems difficult to believe that it might contain private information on the quality of particular principals. It does, however, provide a control for the fact that certain individuals (e.g., Arnold Schwarzenegger) have been involved in many high-grossing films and hence may act somewhat like a brand name in attracting audiences (Rosen, 1981 ; for a history of the emergence of stars in Hollywood, see Bakker, 2001 ).
The second measure attempts to assess the more difficult to observe quality of principals in determining the success of their projects. In essence, this measure asks: how much better or worse did films with this principal do than one would have expected given their genre and rating, the amount spent on marketing them, and their release date? Practically, our estimation involves summing the residuals for the principals involved in the film. In the first stage, we estimated the expected success of each film based on its distributor, genre, rating, opening week screens, release timing and year of release. The residuals between the predicted box office from this estimation and the actual box office provided the 'unexpected' performance of a film. We then calculated individual-level scores for each person in the data set for each year based on the residuals of the films they had been involved in over the preceding three years. To calculate our control, we averaged these scores across all principals involved with a film.
In addition to these measures of the principals involved, the models include two additional film-level attributes. First, a dummy variable indicates whether the production of the film took place in the United States. Films produced outside the United States may have been developed for a different audience, and hence may under-perform U.S.-produced films in the box office. Second, the models include controls for the film's 9 The choice of a window involves two choices: its length and when it should end. We chose to end the experience measure one year prior to the release of the current film as distributors' typically commit to films many months prior to their release, often before filming even begins (Squire, 1992) ; hence, these measures should capture the information available to the distributor at the time it makes a decision. The choice of window length involves balancing the size of the sample used for estimation (since a three year window, for example, requires us to exclude our first three years of data from the analysis) with the reliability of the experience measures. We investigated longer window lengths with similar results, and given the stability of activity patterns within the industry, we adopted a shorter window length.
MPAA rating.
10 Both industry participants and students of the industry widely believe that family-oriented films (G-rated) perform better, and that features produced for mature audiences (R-rated) perform worse, at the box office (Litman, 1983; DeVany and Wallis, 2002; Ravid and Busaroy, 2003) . Dummy variables mark G-and R-rated features, with PG-rated films being the baseline category.
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE

Estimation
The following equation represents our modeling approach for estimating logged box office revenue (ln R):
where DT represents the strength of the direct tie linking the team of principals in film i to distributor j, x refers to a vector of control variables, s denotes a set of fixed effects for distribution companies, g indicates fixed effects with respect to the film genre, and t represents fixed effects for the year of the motion picture's theatrical release. Though we remain agnostic about these effects, prior research has found significant effects on box office performance due to both film genre (Litman, 1983; Prag and Casavant, 1994) and distributor. If embedded exchange allows distribution companies to select better which films they choose to distribute, one would expect a > 0. INSERT Table 3 reports the results of these estimates. The first column provides a baseline estimate of the determinants of box office success without considering who participates in the film or their relations to the distributor. Films produced in the U.S. exhibit higher revenues, perhaps because they had been developed to appeal to the American market; meanwhile R-rated movies showed lower revenue, consistent with previous studies suggesting that Hollywood produces too many adult-oriented films (DeVany and Wallis, 2002; Ravid and Busaroy, 2003) . Distribution companies, genre and year all significantly influence theatrical revenues. Model 5 introduces measures of the size of the team of principals involved in the film and their cumulative experience. Both have significant positive effects on the expected performance of the film. As noted above, each principal may draw from a relatively distinct audience allowing films with more participants to attract a greater number of viewers, or consumers may consider principals additively when deciding whether to see a feature (e.g., moviegoers that like both Sally Field and Reese Witherspoon may have found Legally Blond 2 especially enticing). The fact that experience has a positive effect on box office could reflect several factors including the prominence of the principals, learning on the part of the film's participants, or simply selection.
10 MPAA ratings, initiated in 1968, represent a form of self-regulation by the movie industry in the United States. Distribution companies submit films to a review board for a rating recommendation. These ratings reflect the content of the film: PG and R ratings alert potential viewers that the film contains some type of content (profane language, sensuality, violence or nudity) deemed inappropriate for less mature audiences.
The third set of estimates finally introduces the key variable of interest: the strength of the relationship tying the principals to the distributors. This variable has a substantial effect on the expected box office of the film; a one standard deviation increase in the strength of the team's tie raises its expected revenue by 12% (= e .513 * .213 ). Controlling for both easily observable and unexplained differences in the past performance of the principals does not eliminate the positive effect of the strength of the direct tie, though these variables do improve the overall ability of the model to predict box office receipts (see model 7). Without further analysis, one might then conclude that these effects reflect the ability of distributors to make a better selection of films when they have stronger relations to the principals in the film, presumably thanks to their access to private information. These results, however, fail to account for the distributor's own behavior and how those actions might influence the success of the film.
ACCOUNTING FOR EFFORT
Two variables -both under the control of the distributor -matter tremendously in determining the box office success of a motion picture: the resources allocated to marketing the film and the date on which theaters begin screening the movie.
Several factors account for the importance of release dates: mostly significantly, demand fluctuates substantially over the course of a year. This seasonality when coupled with the short box office life means that release timing can critically affect the success of a film; or as Barry Reardon, Warner Brothers President of Distribution bluntly asserts, "If you don't pick the right release date, you can destroy a movie." (Korts, 2001, pg. 514 ) An article in the Wall Street Journal expands on this noting that:
Studio executives insist the release date is critical, in part because a film's opening weekend is usually the most lucrative one for its studio. Financial agreements with theaters normally give the filmmaker a greater percentage of the box office during the first weeks of release. And in this glutted market, studio executives also worry that theaters will replace a film with another if it doesn't win audience quickly (King, 1991) .
Dependent variables
The number of screens on which a film played in its opening week provides us with a measure of the level of resources allocated to promoting a film.
11 Though one might prefer an exact measure of the dollars devoted to marketing a film, distributors generally do not report these expenditures, making it impossible to assemble comprehensive data. Incentives on both sides of the distributor-exhibitor relationship, however, ensure a tight link between marketing expenditures and the number of screens: When distributors promote a film heavily prior to its release, it makes sense for them to open on as many screens as possible since the positive effects of advertising in the film industry appear to 11 Since limited release films -those first shown on a small number of screens to generate word-of-mouth with the intention of being exhibited on hundreds of screens after a few weeks -follow a very different marketing strategy, we exclude these films from our analysis (roughly 2% of cases). decay very rapidly, reaching nearly zero within two to three weeks after the film's release (Lehmann and Weinberg, 2000) . On the other side, substantial advertising expenditures entice more theater owners to exhibit the film because they know that the advertising will help bring customers to the theaters.
Despite these incentives, an accurate mapping of the number of screens to marketing effort likely requires adjustment for two external factors: supply and demand. When theater owners have more movies from which to choose, each will on average appear on fewer screens. And as the number of screens available increases (from 1985 to 2002 the number of theater screens in the U.S. grew from roughly 20,000 to more than 35,000; NATO, 2002) , each film will open on more screens. To account for these effects, we normalize the number of screens using a measure that accounts for both forces: the average number of screens on which a movie opened in the same year of release.
Corroboration of this proxy involved comparing it to two datasets. The first set includes all films, released between 19xx and 19xx, for which we could locate reports of marketing budgets in Lukk (1997) , the Hollywood Reporter, Variety, or through LEXIS/NEXIS. Within this set of 56 films, our measure correlated .890 with real dollar marketing expenditures. A second sample of actual marketing effort came from a civil case privy to private (presumably more accurate) information on actual media expenditures for a random sample of 250 films with a budget of more than $5 million opening between April 1995 and April 1998 on at least 1000 screens. Even within this relatively truncated range, our measure correlates .410 with actual marketing expenditures.
Seasonality captures the second type of marketing decision, whether a distributor releases a film during a high demand period. Industry participants and observers have long understood that demand varies from week-to-week across the course of a year (Litman, 1983; Radas and Shugan, 1998) . Though most high seasons revolve around holidays, we develop a continuous measure of seasonality by taking a moving average of total box office receipts across all films for a three-week window centered around the film's release date during the previous three years. 12 The three-week average allows the measure to account for the fact that some holidays shift slightly from year-to-year, while using the prior three years of data minimizes the effects of outliers on our seasonality measure. Figure 2 depicts the average value of the seasonality variable over the course of the year. One can clearly see that some weeks, particularly those surrounding major holidays and the height of summer offer much larger potential audiences.
INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE
Estimation
Our approach to estimating marketing behavior essentially parallels that of our performance models:
12 Prior research investigating seasonality in the film industry has typically looked only at whether a release falls on a holiday (e.g., Litman, 1983) , though Ravid (1999) takes a similar approach to seasonality. Figure  2 clearly shows the importance of non-holiday related variation in sales.
where M can either denote the relative number of screens or seasonality (total demand in the three week window surrounding a film's release), DT again represents the strength of the direct tie linking the team of principals to the distributor, x refers to a vector of control variables, and s, g, and t denote fixed effects for distribution companies, film genre and year respectively. The models estimating correlates of marketing decisions differ in two respects from the performance models. On the one hand, the models reported in table 3 lack controls for the number of principals in the film. Though each principal might represent a draw to a unique audience, we found it more difficult to imagine why the number of principals might influence these marketing decisions.
13 On the other hand, the models here do include controls for the length of the film. Particularly when considering determinants of the number of opening week screens, theaters may need more screens with a longer movie to meet the same level of demand (since the longer length necessarily entails fewer show times on each screen).
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The first two columns of Table 4 report the correlates of the number of opening week screens, a proxy for marketing expenditures. Model 8 demonstrates that distributors choose to open films on more screens when they have a stronger direct tie to the principals involved in the film. This result holds even after controlling for easilyobservable and difficult-to-observe quality differences among these principals (model 11); interestingly, distribution companies appear insensitive to quality differences across films' participants when making decisions regarding the amount of effort to allocate to marketing a new film. Among the control variables, U.S. produced films, G-rated films and longer movies open on more screens; R-rated movies open on fewer screens than all others. These results seem sensible as industry participants believe that G-rated films attract larger audiences while R-rated features appeal to a smaller set (or at least, some of those to whom it appeals may find it difficult to gain admittance; see Medved, 1992 , for qualitative evidence), also longer movies require more screens to schedule the same number of showings during the peak daily demand period from 7pm to 11pm.
The final two columns provide a parallel analysis of the determinants of a film's opening date. Once again, model 10 reveals that distribution companies favor films involving principals with whom they have previously worked, this time with respect to scheduling these films for attractive release dates. As with the number of screens, the observable and unexplained past performance of the participants involved in a project appear to have no effect on the scheduling of its release.
Re-estimating box office
To see how these marketing decisions influenced the performance of the films, Table 5 re-estimates the revenue models controlling for these factors. The first column in the table simply recounts the last model from Table 3 to ease comparisons. Model 12, the second column, includes the number of opening week screens and seasonality to account for marketing decisions. Both have very large and significant effects. Increasing marketing effort, as represented by a larger number of opening week screens, dramatically improves the expected performance of the film. For example, opening on double the average number of screens nearly quadruples the expected box office revenue (348% = e 1.248 * (2-1) ). Though less pronounced, release timing has a similar effect on performance. Each unit of total demand (seasonality) raises a film's expected box office by roughly 17%. Since the total demand varies by a factor of more than three across the course of a year, opening a movie between Christmas and New Year's Day (the peak period) versus the middle of September (the weakest time) increases its expected revenue by more than 80%. Notably, the effect of prior relations with the distributor disappears after controlling for these factors; thus, it would appear that the positive effect of embedded transaction exists not because distributors show greater acuity in selecting films when they have prior experience with the principals, but rather because they favor these films when allocating their valuable marketing dollars and release windows.
INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE
Model 13 examines this finding in somewhat more detail. The non-significant effect of prior relations, while interesting, merely reveals that the choice does not appear to matter; in the absence of a better method for choosing which pictures to promote, this bias in favor of embedded transactions does not necessarily imply any economic inefficiency. The third column evaluates, somewhat more saliently, whether the returns to marketing investments vary across movies as a function of the strength of the direct tie between the distributor and the film's principals. We test this by interacting each of the marketing variables -number of screens and seasonality -with the strength of the direct tie linking the principals to the distributor.
14 The results reveal that distributors receive lower average returns from their efforts to open movies with which they have stronger ties. Likewise, these films also benefit less from favorable opening dates. In each case, a one standard deviation increase in the strength of the tie linking the distributor to the film reduces the effectives of promotion effort by about 6%.
15 These negative coefficients suggest a suboptimal equilibrium, since distributors apparently would have benefited from allocating their effort more evenly across the films that they carried.
These results also allow us to rule out a subtle alternative explanation for our results. One might argue that distributors allocate more to marketing films with principals with whom they have previously worked because they learn how best to promote these pictures. If that story held, however, we would expect to see a positive coefficient on the interaction term between the strength of the tie and marketing effort and seasonality because 14 We mean deviate the variables before calculating the interaction term to minimize the co-linearity of the interaction with its components. 15 The effect of the relative number of screens declines from roughly 1.3 to 1.21, a 7% decline, with a one standard deviation increase in tie strength, and the seasonality coefficient shrinks from .17 to .16, a 6% reduction in effect. distributors should realize increasing returns to their investments in a particular set of principals. The models nonetheless find the opposite.
Careful examination of the other coefficients reveals another interesting type of selfconfirming dynamic: Consistent with both industry beliefs and prior findings (which did not account for marketing effects), the models that do not control for marketing effort show that R-rated movies garner lower revenues than similar G-and PG-rated features. This effect appears to exist, however, as a result of distributors' own marketing decisions: They both open these movies on fewer screens, 27% fewer on average, and release them during lower demand times of the year. After controlling for these decisions, R-rated features show no distinguishable difference in box office performance from movies targeted at younger audiences. Thus, it would appear then that distributors should actually devote greater resources to promoting adult-oriented films.
16
INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE Though the aggregated results support our thesis, it also seems interesting to consider whether particular roles among the set of principals appear more relevant to the projects' success. Table 6 therefore provides a set of estimates in which we separate both the strength of the film's tie to the distributors and the experience and quality measures by role (producer, writer, director and actors). The results suggest some interesting nuances to these dynamics.
Comparing the coefficients before (models 12 and 13) and after (models 14 and 15) the inclusion of the marketing variables suggests that producers and actors play particularly strong roles in determining distributor promotion effort. Though some might argue that brand name actors increase the effectiveness of advertising, note that the strength of the relationship to the distributor (rather than the actors observable and unexplained past success) generates this relationship; indeed, the inclusion of disaggregated terms of the past performance of the actors and actresses involved in a project as a predictor of marketing effort fails to show any significant relation between the two.
On the other hand, consideration of the disaggregated effects of experience and unexplained quality give us some sense of the importance of each party to the quality (or at least expected success) of the finished product. Directors appear to have the strongest effect on film performance, showing both strong positive experience effects and strong autocorrelation in success across their projects. Actors also seem to have a substantial impact on the success of the films in which they participate, though interestingly the small magnitude of the experience coefficient suggests that they experience little return to learning (or selection pressure). Meanwhile, writers and producers appear to contribute minimally to the expected success of a film (after controlling for marketing efforts); one 16 Indeed, interaction effects parallel to those included in models 10 and 11 suggest that distributors receive higher average returns to marketing R-rated movies than more family-oriented fare, though it does not appear that they would benefit from re-thinking the release timing of these films (perhaps not surprising as the school holidays that seem to drive much of the seasonality in demand likely have less influence on adult movie-goers). might therefore argue that the primary importance of the producer to a film comes via the link that individual provides to the distribution channel. 
